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5	Attorney for Plaintiff CALIFORNIA VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE	
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10	CALIFORNIA VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE,	Case No. 08 CV 0120 BEN AJB
11	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE
12	V.	OF VENUE TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
13	THE CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION; and DOES	SACRAMENTO DIVISION
14	1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive,	DATE: March 10, 2008 TIME: 10:30 A.M.
15	Defendants.	COURTROOM: 3 LOCATION: 940 Front Street
16		San Diego, A 92101 JUDGE: Hon. Roger J. Benitez
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19	Plaintiff California Valley Miwok Tribe ("Miwok Tribe" or Plaintiff) submits the	
20	following memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Defendant California	
21	Gambling Control Commission's ("the Commission") Motion for Change of Venue to the	
22	Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division.	
23	l.	
24	INTRODUCTION	
25	The Commission concedes that venue was proper here in San Diego County.	
26	(Defendant's Points and Authorities, pg. 2 lines 2-3.) However, since there is no subject	
27	matter jurisdiction, the Commission's motion will be moot.	
28	The Compact does not require or	"establish" that this dispute be venued in
	DI AINTIEE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFE	08 CV 0120 BEN AJB NDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
	FLAINTIFF 3 OFFOSITION TO DEFE	INDANT O MICHOR FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

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Sacramento County. In fact, State law specifically permits it to be venued here in San Diego County.

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II.

ARGUMENT

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THIS CASE IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCRETIONARY "CONVENIENCE" TRANSFER UNDER 28 USC § 1404(a)

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Transfer under 28 USC § 1404(a) "for the convenience of parties, witnesses and in the interest of justice" is <u>discretionary</u>. However, before the court can even exercise any discretion to transfer, it <u>must</u> be shown that the proposed transferee court is one in which the action <u>could have been commenced</u> originally, *i.e.*, one "where it might have been brought." 28 USC § 1404(a). This has been interpreted to mean that: (1) the proposed transferee court would have had <u>subject matter jurisdiction</u>; (2) defendants would have been subject to <u>personal jurisdiction</u>; and (3) venue would have been <u>proper</u>, *Hoffman v. Balski* (1960) 363 U.S. 335, 343-344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1089-1090.

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Based upon these facts, transfer to Sacramento would be improper. As shown in Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, there is <u>no federal question</u> jurisdiction and thus the case could not have been commenced in the Eastern District of California, Sacramento, to begin with. The dispute involves only the Commission's duty to disburse RSTF under state law, and a declaratory relief action to determine that duty. The suit does <u>not</u> ask the Court to make any determination as to whether the Miwok Tribe is a "federally recognized government." Instead, the Plaintiff's suit simply asks the Court to determine what the <u>Commission's</u> duties and responsibilities are as to the RSTF money, based upon undisputed fact, including the fact that the Miwok Tribe is "unorganized" and yet the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") still recognizes Sylvia Burley as an official representative of the Miwok Tribe, albeit "unorganized". If those facts are true, then Plaintiff contends that the Commission has a duty to continue making RSTF payments, in the same manner as it has done in the past. Accordingly, no federal question jurisdiction is implicated, and the case therefore could never have been brought in the U.S. District Court in

Sacramento, or any other federal district court.

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As a result, the issue of convenience of the "witnesses" or "parties" never comes into play and is thus irrelevant.

Because there is no subject matter jurisdiction, the Commission's Motion to Transfer should be denied on this reason alone.

B. THE COMPACT DOES NOT "ESTABLISH A PREFERENCE" FOR ADJUDICATING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS IN SACRAMENTO

Inexplicably, the Commission repeatedly misquotes the Compact, falsely saying in its moving papers that the Compact 'states a preference that this action should be brought in the jurisdiction in which the Plaintiff resides." (Defendant's Motion, pg. 2, lines

... <u>plainly</u> establish[es] a preference that a breach of compact action such as this be tried in the district in which the tribe alleging a breach is located. (Emphasis added.)

6-8.) It cites Section 11.2.1(c.) of the Compact and represents the Court that it:

(Defendant's Points and Authorities, pg. 3, lines 7-9); (see also Defendant's Points and Authorities, pg. 3, line 1, and lines 20-21). These state in relevant part as follows:

Either <u>party may</u> bring an action in federal court . . . for a <u>declaration</u> that <u>the other party</u> has materially breached this Compact . . . In the event a federal court determines that it lacks jurisdiction over such an action, the action may be brought in the superior court for the <u>county in which the Tribe's Gaming Facility is</u> located . . . (Emphasis added.)

(Compact, pg. 40, Section 11.2.1(c)). First of all, this section of the Compact does <u>not</u> state that Plaintiff's suit must be brought in the district where the tribe is located. Secondly, and most importantly, the language of this Section clearly and unequivocably applies only to the State as <u>Compact</u> Tribes, <u>not</u> non-Compact Tribes. Plaintiff is <u>not</u> a party to the Compact, and therefore this section does not apply to it. Non-Compact Tribes by their very definition are Tribes, like Plaintiff, who do <u>not</u> have any gaming facilities, or who operate fewer than 350 devices. Section 4.3.2.1(b).3.2(a)(i). That is why the RSTF was set up. The Compact Tribes who generate money from their respective

gaming facilities (casinos) pay into the RSTF, so that Non-Compact Tribes, like Plaintiff, can share in profits. But the Non-Compact Tribes are <u>not</u> parties to the Compact, and because many of them, like Plaintiff, have no gaming facilities, the phrase "action may be brought in the superior court for the county in which the Tribes' Gaming Facility is located" cannot and does not apply to them. (<u>see</u> pg. 2, para 6 of the complaint.) Thus, the Commission's statement that the Compact (plainly" establishes that Plaintiff's suit must be brought in Sacramento County, because that is where Plaintiff's "gaming facility is located", is misleading and false. Plaintiff has no gaming facility. (Complaint, pg. 2, para 6.) Section 11.2.1(c) does not apply to Plaintiff, a Non-Compact Tribe with no gaming facility.

C. IF THIS CASE IS REMANDED, THE COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE WILL BE MOOT

Obviously, should this Court grant Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, the Commission's Motion to Transfer to Sacramento will be moot. It is for this reason that Plaintiff requests the Court first decide the remand motion.

D. THE COMMISSION HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING FACTS SUPPORTING IT'S MOTION

A 28 USC § 1404(a) motion for "convenience" transfer <u>must</u> be supported by a declaration, or affidavit establishing admissible facts pertaining to the residence of the parties, the location of witnesses, physical evidence, etc. Conclusory declarations are not sufficient. *Stop-A-Flat Corp. v. Electra Start of Michigan, Inc.* (ED PA 1981) 507 F.Supp. 647, 652. The Commission's motion is devoid of any such admissible evidence, and no declaration has been attached, as is required.

On this basis alone, the motion should be denied. *Heller Fin'l, Inc., v. Midwhey Powder Co.* (7th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1286, 1293.

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III. **CONCLUSION** For the foregoing reasons, the Commission's Motion for Change of Venue under 28 USC § 1404(a) should be denied, or otherwise determined to be moot. s/ Manuel Corrales, Jr. Manuel Corrales, Jr. Attorney for Plaintiff DATED: February 22, 2008 The California Valley Miwok Tribe 08 CV 0120 BEN AJB Document 11 Filed 02/22/2008 Page 6 of 6

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